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TOWARD THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE SOCIAL POLICY PROCESS
By
L. K. Northwood
School of Social Work
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.

What is it that the citizen buys each year when he pays his taxes?
He buys a set of promises from those who govern. The first promise is "to
organize the common activities of the society for the good of the individual
or the whole" (Webster, 1976, p. 497). The power rests in organization;
where there is no organization there is no government. Second, the
government promises "to exert a determining or guiding influence over
expenditures and the availability of choices." Third, it promises to keep
"a straight course, under proper control, or in smooth operation for the
Finally, it promises "to exercise
good of the individual or the whole."
continuous sovereign authority, especially to control and direct the making
and administration of policy."
Thus, what a citizen expects from his government, what he hopes he is buying
with his taxes, are a set of public social policies that are benevolent,
sound, and reasonable. And a public social policy may be defined as the
promise that the government makes to its citizenry.
Throughout the years the taxpayer in the United States has become skeptical
about what he is getting for his money. For example, in 1978, the average
tax collected by the federal government from every four-person household was
$5,104, according to the statistics of Tax Foundation, Inc., reported in the
Seattle Times of March 6, 1978 (Brandon, Rowe, and Stanton, 1978; W. Cohen,
1978). This does not include the high local and state taxes on food,
property, and income. Taxes continue to go higher and higher each year, and
the taxpayer--squeezed by price inflation which is rising more rapidly than
his paycheck--is beginning to demand an accounting.
What is the money being spent for, and is there a sound reason for this?
What the taxpayer wants to know is whether government social policies are
benevolent, sound and reasonable?
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the nature of social policies
and the public policymaking process. It is demonstrated that public social
policies tend to accrue an aura or ideology of benevolence that is only
partially warranted, and that may be quite misleading to policy analysts and
citizenry. The major thrust of the paper is to consider the social policy
process as a strategy for public decision-making. As such, properly organized,
it can provide an alternative and complementary strategy to electoral politics
and protest movements. To be effective as a strategy, three major barriers
must be overcome: the lack of openness in the public policy process, the active
discouragement of citizen participation, and the failure to evaluate policy
outcomes. Some notions are advanced about how social policy analysts and
researchers can improve their work and thereby assist in the democratization of
thp nrnrp c

What is the Nature of the Public Social Policy Process?
There are seven general characteristics of the public policy process
frequently identified by its analysts. These are presented in this section
of the paper.
1.

First of all, it should be noted that usual definitions of public
policy do not stress the implied promise contained in government social
policy. Thus a policy is considered as the formal statement of the
guiding goals and acceptable procedures governing a plan of organized
action. Unlike an impromptu command or suggestion, it represents a
reasoned decision. It embodies "a definite course of method selected
from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide
and determine present and future decisions (Webster, 1976, p. 890).
According to Gil (1973, p. 12), policies lead to, but need not be
codified in formal legal instruments. They are merely the "guiding
principles or courses of action adopted and pursued by societies and
their governments, as well as by various groups or units within
society. . . . Specific policies govern, or are intended to govern,
specified domains of society or its subunits."

2.

Policies, however, are not simply the property of governmental units.
They may be formulated by individuals or groups that are nongovernmental
in character, and they may be implemented by any unit or subunit of
society. In general, policies, whether formulated under private or
government auspices, overtly or covertly, are public in character.
They are intended to influence the activities of government, some
sector of society, or the people as a whole. Thus, in a democracy,
governmental policies are usually accorded a review, and are intended
to be "of the people, by the people, and for the people." The extent
to which this is a true statement is moot. Nevertheless, the public
character of such policies is strongly sanctioned both by tradition and
legislative mandate. No definition of policy was found by the author
that does not embrace this assumption.

3.

At its point of inception, the policy act represents an agreement or
compromise among the individuals or parties engaging in the decision
making. Moreover, it is shaped and compromised by subsequent
interpretations given it, and through the activities required for its
implementation. Thus a social policy is more than a formal statement
per'se; it is a normative process. The policy itself is not simply an
inert instrument through which social changes flow. For example, an
important social policy, such as the Social Security Act, has acquired
an independent status of its own. While formally instituted in the.
legislative bureaucracy, it has become a part of the culture and
tradition of the United States. In this way, policies over time, in
general, exhibit both the characteristics of directed social change and
growth. They are planned, negotiated and accumulated on the basis of
the decisions with which an organization is confronted. The author
makes the same distinction between social policy and social program as
does Tropman et al. (1976, p. xiii): "Policy is seen as a source of
action or intended action conceived as deliberately adopted, after a
review of possible alternatives, and pursued or intended to be pursued,"

while a social program is adapted to achieve a certain set of limited
objectives and goals. Social program relates only to a small part of
the social system in which we live. Social policy is of a much broader
nature. It relates to a series of programs aimed at achieving some
objectives and goals. It relates to the social system in its entirety.
4.

The establishment of a policy is a collective attempt to deliberately
shape or guide the social changes that are taking place in the
organization and the environment, and to assure that there will be a
desired outcome. As such, the policy process is an attempt at directed
social change. And all policies are developed within an organizational
context which is dynamic and changing.
The policy attempts to shape subsequent action not only by specifying
the ends towards which the efforts are directed. It also places
restrictions on the means to be employed in the plan of organized
action. The restrictions are specified in the statement of "acceptable"
principles and procedures to be employed in affecting the outcomes.

5.

Every policy embodies theories of problem formulation and solution.
However, the policy is not simply a solution to a specified problem.
The policy encompasses appropriate modifications in the key processes
which transform a given condition into a social problem. Thus, the
social changes induced and guided by policy are intended to modify the
social conditions per se to assure that such social problems are
ameliorated, removed or prevented (L. K. Northwood, 1966, pp. 8-9).
Policy has a much broader objective than simple problem-solving. While
most policy analysts would agreewith the point of view expressed in
this paragraph, many of them emphasize the latter three stages of the
policy process which are described in the following section while they
ignore the first stage. By downplaying the initial problem solution
stage of the policy, analysts tend to discount the trial-error
character of the process; they underplay the real social conflicts that
are engendered around social policies. Therefore, it is safe to say
that no significant social policy has been introduced and institutionalized without the support of a mass movement and in the teeth of
important mass opposition.

6.

Generally, every enduring policy becomes transformed and institutionalized during the processes of its formulation and implementation. It
assumes a charter of its own, a social structure for its personnel,
auxiliaries and beneficiaries, and a collective will to survive that
resides in its culture and practices. And every enduring policy also
helps to generate its opposition.
The four critical stages in the institutionalization process are (Gil,
1973, pp. 36-55; Gilbert and Specht, 1974, pp. 14-20):
I. The problem/solution stage, which embodies questions of the
following order: Which of the many domains of concern to a
society constitutes the focus of the policy? What is the problem?
Whose problem? What conditions require change? What is the
solution?

II. The goals/objectives stage, which involves winning sufficient
public support for the policy, and which answers questions such
as: Who benefits and who does not? How would the policy affect
this domain in substantive terms? How would society as a whole be
affected by the substantive consequences of the policy?
III. The Planning/implementation stage, which spells out how the
benefits are to be provided and with what hypothesized effects. A
key question is: What effects may be expected from the interaction of the policy with various forces within and without society?
IV. The review and evaluation stage, which assesses both the policy's
performance and achievements. Such questions are asked as: What
alternative policies could be defined to achieve the same or
different policy objectives concerning the specific domain? Was
the planned change efficient and effective? Can it be accomplished more efficiently and effectively by another means?
7.

A final characteristic of public social policies, and of social welfare
policies in particular, is the aura of benevolence with which they are
invested. This ideology of benevolence has many positive functions,
but it also can be quite misleading and non-productive. The author is
is accord with the commonly held belief that social welfare policies
ought to be directed toward improving the human condition and with
solving serious social problems. However, the stated intention of the
policy is often at variance with its known effects and consequences
(Northwood, 1977, 1978). Therefore, a policy should'be characterized
as benevolent only after careful analysis is made of the policy in
action, and whether it achieves the desired outcome of improved social
conditions for its designated beneficiaries and the society as a whole.
For these reasons, this section is devoted to an examination of the
ideology of benevolence and the part it plays in the characterization
of social policy. In particular, we will be concerned with the assumption that all policies of the political state, called the "welfare
state" or the "welfare society," are benevolent social policies simply
because of their auspices.

How does the ideology of benevolence come to permeate social policy?
First of all, this is a natural process. Most of the terminology employed
in the discussion of social policies is already made up of words and concepts which are positively valued in the society such as: social, social
welfare, beneficiaries, problem-solving, responsibility in planning,
effectiveness, efficiency, user satisfaction, equity, equality, well-being,
volunteerism, altruism, and so forth. Social planning is conceived of as an
active effort to do something thoughtfully and rationally; and that is
better than doing nothing. Social policies, ipso facto, are "social reforms"
because they involve an alteration in "bad" existing conditions. Thus, the
suggestion of beneficence is implied in the label "social reform."
Furthermore, to be enacted and implemented, social policies must win public
support. They are frequently formulated in rhetoric that evokes traditional
values, national pride and community solidarity. The policy objectives are

transformed into slogans for public consumption. These slogans may
characterize a single social policy where no enabling legislation has come
into existence, or they may characterize a single social program which is
not guided by a comprehensive framework of social policy. Where there are
both social programs and a comprehensive framework of policy, the nation
with this implementing machinery is sometimes called a "welfare state" or a
"welfare society."
For example, it is sometimes forgotten that "The Welfare State" had its
origins in the times of war and, in fact, has been characterized as a "war
strategy." The Parliament of Great Britain commissioned Sir William Beverage
to draw up a plan for the reform of social services in June, 1941, when the
bombs were falling in the streets next to Westminster. The plan called for
the maintenance of full employment, comprehensive free health care and
rehabilitation services, and social insurance from the cradle to the grave.
By 1945, the term "Welfare State" had achieved popular currency. Titmuss,
the eminent welfare historian, characterizes this movement as "an imperative
for war strategy . . . that the war could not be won unless millions of
ordinary people, in Britain and overseas, were convinced that we had
something better to offer than had our enemies--not only during but after
the war (Titmuss, 1969, p. 82).
The outline of the "Welfare State" in the United States took shape somewhat
earlier and for somewhat different reasons. Romanyshin (1971, p. 159)
reports that the "New Deal" measures of the 1930's:
. . . were designed to preserve the capitalistic system from total
collapse. Establishing measures of income security, social legislation
in this period also served to bolster a badly shaken economy and to
preserve rather than dismantle the market system. One may indeed say
that social welfare is, in fact, the answer of liberal capitalism to
the challenge of socialism.
These propagandistic uses of social policies impose an added imperative to
mitigate possible conflict and opposition, and to present the policy in
glowing and positive terms which testify as to its progressive character and
benevolence.
By far the most frequently used strategy for incorporating an ideology of
benevolence is the practice of social policy analysts to build into their
definitions of the social policy process desirable procedures and desirable
outcomes. Thus, for T. H. Marshall (1967, preface), social policy is "the
policy of governments with regard to action having a direct impact on the
welfare of citizens, by providing them with services of income."
For both
Titmuss (1968, p. 188-89) and Marshall, social policy flows from the state's
right to interfere with individual freedom and economic liberty to promote
the welfare of the whole population (Baumleier and Scholl, 1977, p. 1454).
Pusic (1969) defines social policy as "the quest for equalization under
conditions of growth," and Boulding thinks of it as "the sum total of public
policies that underpin and strengthen the "integrative system" in any
society (Rohrlich, 1977, p. 1465)." Where the nature of the desired outcome
is assuring the happiness, prosperity or well-being of any society, the
policy'is called "social welfare policy." It is postulated that social
welfare policies are intended to improve the conditions of life of the

public in general and to alleviate the distress of the poorest and most
disadvantaged.
Moreover, for Gil (1973, p. 13):
Social policies are a special type of policies, namely, policies which
deliberately pertain to the quality of life and to the circumstances of
living in society, and to the intra-societal relationships among
individuals, groups and society as a whole. And any specific social
policy, irrespective of its unique content, objectives and scope, is
thus one discrete instance of this type of policies.
It is a shared "common domain" that identifies a social policy and
differs it from policies in general.

Another way of conferring benevolence on social policies involves the prior
labeling of the political state as a "welfare state."
Once having accorded
this label, the social programs and policies are accorded benevolence
without testing whether the designation is warranted or not. This dubious
process is followed by Blanche Coll (1977, p. 1503) in her assessment of
social welfare in the United States. The existing policy framework is cast
in an image of benevolence, which ignores the reality described in the third
part of this paper. For Coll:
The welfare state, which emerged in all western democracies after World
War II, is characterized by a large complex of interlocking preventive
and protective laws and organizations, designed to provide, at the
least, universal access to the mainstream of society. . . . In affluent
countries, such as the United States, social welfare includes
considerably more than assuring the necessities to support life.
Inherent in the philosophy of the welfare state is the ever present,
active assistance to individuals and groups to facilitate their
attaining and maintaining a respectable life style.
Whereas, Call merely asserts the benevolence of the United States as a
"welfare state," Miller and Clark (1977), following Wilensky (1975), have
attempted to prove that the United States is not a "welfare state laggard"
in comparison with other modern industrial nations. The authors start with
a statement that (Ibid., p. 382) "it seems obvious that the United States is
not meeting the welfare needs of all its citizens in an adequate and
equitable manner." However, after an analysis of the trends in national
spending for warfare and welfare, they conclude that "the United States
actually spent more in welfare state programs than would be predicted for a
country of its description, at least for 1966 (Ibid., p. 398)." Not a
single word in the article questions the "benevolence" of the national
priorities, and not a single comparison is made of the discrepancy of the
"welfare state" objectives and the achievement of these objectives.
The easy way that certain policy analysts have conferred benevolence on
almost every policy of "welfare states" located in the United States and
Western Europe, and, in contrast, have denigrated almost every social policy
in the countries of Eastern Europe, has led to much criticism and also to
much misunderstanding about the nature of social welfare and social policies.

For example, the conservative "supporter" of the "welfare society" in Great
Britain, William Robson, denies that a benevolent program of protections,
entitlements and benefits can exist in countries of a socialist persuasion
because they lack the "social freedom" which is an "essential ingredient of
the welfare state" (Robson, 1976, p. 16). At the same time, he deplores
that Great Britain has not yet achieved the status of a "welfare society"
because of misguided interpretations of principles of equity and equality,
economic redistribution, central planning, nationalization and public
ownership, collective bargaining in the public sector, and so forth.
On the other hand, David Gil, a progressive social welfare analyst, views
all welfare state policies and services as characterized by "inequality,
domination, competition and self-orientation" (1976, p. 147). That is, in
essence they are non-benevolent. They are designed to "pacify, condition
and control their populations, and defend and perpetuate their systems"
"to abolish
(Ibid., p. 161). There is only one "real solution" to welfare:
its institutionalized version by liberating productive resources and
assuring success to these resources to all humans on equal terms so that
they may become free, independent, productive and self-reliant citizens of
Is it too much to
self-directing, democratic and cooperative communities."
ask of Gil that he outline workable alternatives in other terms than a
statement of basic values and philosophy?
What Robson and Gil have in common is a philosophic stance, albeit differing
in content, which grows out of their own personal experiences and their
assessments of the social conditions in which they are situated. However,
it is hard reality in an imperfect world that requires a much more concrete
and scheduled program of policies and practices if policies are to be made
beneficial and if reform is to be consummated.
What Are the Criteria of Benevolence
How, then, can a test of the benevolence of a social policy be made empirically? As indicated earlier, it is not sufficient merely to have indicators
of intention in the initial statement of goals, objectives and "acceptable"
operating procedures for the policy; there must be tests of actual
performance and actual outcome. A policy must be sound and reasonable in
order to achieve its effectiveness. Furthermore, policies which are unsound
and unreasonable cannot be benevolent for the society as a whole in the long
run. Therefore, we incorporate criteria of social effectiveness and efficiency into the test of the benevolence of a policy.
Gilbert and Specht (1974, pp. 39-46) point out that there are three "core
values" that shape the design of social welfare policy, and which provide
some of the criteria by which it may be judged as benevolent or not. The
three core values are equality, equity and adequacy.
Equality relates to the outcome of the benefit allocations proposed in the
policy. Are the benefits allocated in such a way as to equalize the distribution of resources and opportunities available in the society?
Equity is the value which prescribes "that people receive that which they
deserve based on their contributions to society, modified by considerations

not of their own making
for those whose inability to contribute is clearly
the benefits
(Gilbert and Specht, p. 41). The question must be asked: Do
Of course, there are
actually go to beneficiaries designated by the policy?
according to
many "equitable inequalities" that are normatively sanctioned,
Gilbert and Specht. For example, preferential treatment is accorded
veterans, and in unemployment benefits that vary in proportion of prior
earnings. There is always some debate over who should receive preferential
treatment. Most social welfare policies single out the poorest and the most
disadvantaged sectors of society for preferential treatment. In the case of
the United States, however, the "iron rule" of the English Poor Law of 1834
still prevails, that is, that the benefits given the poor and the needy
shall not exceed "the situation of the independent laborer of the lowest
class." This provision is intended to assure that able-bodied recipients
support themselves by their own work rather than depending on government
welfare.
At the same time, the provision of limited or inadequate benefits to the
poor directly contradicts the third core value listed by Gilbert and Specht,
that of adequacy. Adequacy refers to "the belief that it is desirable to
provide a decent standard of physical and spiritual well-being, quite apart
from concerns of whether benefit allocations are equal or differential
according to merit" (Ibid., pp. 41-42).
The three core values of equality, equity and adequacy provide some of the
criteria for the evaluation of the benevolence of social policy. In essence,
they answer the question: Does the social policy achieve distributive
justice? A social policy that does not achieve distributive justice is
hardly a benevolent policy.
There are three other important criteria that relate to benevolence of
social policy. They refer to the "acceptable" principles and procedures for
implementing the policy. They are the principles of social effectiveness,
efficiency and democracy.
The simplest definition of effective is "capable of producing a result"
(Webster, 1976, p. 362). A socially effective policy is one capable of
producing the desired outcome with a minimum of undesirable side effects.
Thus, a policy aimed at eliminating, preventing or mitigating a social
problem condition must have at its disposal the resources necessary to
produce the desired effects. The resources include manpower, finances,
organization, social controls and the knowledge of how to combine these and
other elements into workable strategies.
The validity of any measure of social effectiveness is affected by the scope
assigned to social welfare practice. Some analysts conceive of social
welfare practice as simply a "benefit-allocation mechanism functioning
outside the market place" (Gilbert and Specht, 1974, p. 28). Thus, they
restrict their analysis to the activities of social welfare agencies and
organizations per se. Everything else, the economic, political and cultural
activities of the broader society, are considered "externalities" which, to
be sure, have an effect on social welfare practice, but which are not
subject to the controls built into the policy.

The rationale for such a narrow definition of social policy is based on the
assumption that social welfare practice typically involves a non-monetary,
reciprocal exchange between recipients and society via the welfare agencies,
whereas the market system operates on a much different basis--that of buyers
and sellers, exchanging concrete goods and services, usually in direct cash
transactions for private profit. While it is true that there is a marked
difference between market transactions and those that occur in welfare
programs, it is also true that the market activities vitally affect the
social welfare. In reality, people and social services respond to the
market conditions in many vital ways. As Marshall (1972, pp. 19-20) has
observed:
The central function of welfare, in fact, is to supercede the market by
taking goods and services out of it, or in some way to control and
modify its operations so as to produce a result which it could not have
produced itself. In contrast to the economic process, it is a
fundamental principle of the Welfare State that the market value of an
individual cannot be the measure of his right to welfare.
The claim of the individual to welfare is sacred
partakes of the character of a natural right . .
the Welfare State does not merely have the right
has the right to receive it, even if the pursuit
particularly hot (Marshall, 1965, p. 268).

and irrefutable and
. but the citizen of
to pursue welfare; he
has not been

Therefore, social policies should be constructed which have as their central
focus the alteration of conditions that prevail in the private market. And
these policies are sound welfare policies because they are designed to
improve the social welfare for particular categories or the society as a
whole. Policies which follow the narrow guidelines can only hope to shuffle
services and programs within existing agency orbits, and their social
effectiveness is limited. They depend on the dubious benevolence of private
entrepreneurs to reform the economy and the society, while the agencies
concentrate their focus on social programs that are allegedly responsive to
human need and concentrate on building integration and a sense of community
in an unjust society.
The second criterion refers to the efficiency of organization in the
implementation of policy. Efficiency is a standard in which the performance
of the organization is compared with its cost in time, money and energy
(Webster, 1976, p. 465). In order to measure efficiency it is necessary to
search out the underlying principles on which the system of services is
rendered, to challenge their plausibility and validity, and to examine the
consequences of pursuing programs based on these principles (Rein, 1970, p.
463). No new policy is proposed that does not promise improvements in the
efficiency of the organization and cost effectiveness--these are highly
regarded as beneficient societal values. Furthermore, where these
principles are coupled with procedures that allow for freedom of choice,
freedom of dissent and citizen participation in the provision, delivery and
review of services, there is seldom disagreement among users, professional
persons or the public in general. The ideology of benevolence is, then,
incorporated into the means of execution of the policy.

The final criterion of the benevolence of a social policy is derived from an
examination of how the policy is implemented. The criterion is called
democracy. There are many meanings of the term in the context of social
policy.
First of all, democracy means that there will be provisions for effective
citizen participation in all phases of the social policy process.
Representative democracy is a form of organization which provides the
mandate and the procedures for formally involving the people and their
representatives in the policy process. But as organizations grow in size
and complexity, the day-to-day participation in the process of governing
becomes more attenuated, and special forms and procedures need to be
instituted. These vary greatly depending on whether the primary purpose of
participation is to give or get information; to facilitate conjoint planning
or decision making; to permit review or sanction; or to mobilize the people
in the organization and delivery of services. A democratic social policy
process involves all these strategies.
Second, democracy refers to the openness of the policy process. Too many
policies, too often, are formulated behind closed doors. The information on
which policy is based is not often easily available to the public; or it is
shrouded in secrecy; or it is scheduled for release in insufficient time and
quantity to permit careful study; or it is released after the fact when the
initial guiding decisions have already been formulated. Since policies, and
governmental social policies in particular, are essentially a public process,
it is essential that the information processes be organized in such a way
that they are open to the general public and their representatives, easily
accessible, and presented in a scheduled way so that the policy choices and
procedures are real and understandable.
Third, social policies affect human life. There are many considerations of
choice which affect the manner in which the policy is implemented. For
instance, the values of privacy, dignity, work, independence and participation influence the criteria of eligibility, the forms of social provision,
the design of delivery, and financial arrangements. If all individuals are
to be treated as equal members of society, the allocation of benefits should
avoid shame, stigma or excessive bureaucratic rigamarole. Where provisions
are offered in forms which, necessarily, must restrict the individual's
choice, these must be weighed carefully in scale of the public welfare. The
freedom to dissent and to advocate must be preserved. Furthermore, on
issues concerning local autonomy vs. centralized control, the values
inherent in local autonomy should be carefully considered. During the
policy process it may become necessary to sacrifice some aspects of cost
effectiveness and efficiency in order to achieve the beneficient practice of
democratic participation and social effectiveness.
In summary, all six criteria should be observed in the assessment of social
policies, and together they form the basis on which a policy can be adjudged
as benevolent, sound and reasonable. The leading questions that should be
asked of a social policy are as follows. Questions 1 and 2 pertain particularly to the benevolent character of the policy; question 3 to its soundness;
and question 4 to its reasonable character.

1.

Does the policy achieve distributive justice as measured in terms of
equality, equity and adequacy? Does the policy improve the social
conditions of the designated beneficiaries?

2.

Does the policy allow for the broadest form of democratic participation
consistent with the achievement of the desired outcome? Does the
policy conflict with or render void an essential principle of democratic
government?

3.

Is the policy socially effective; does it facilitate the desired
outcome? If not, why not? Are sufficient resources allocated to the
implementation of the policy so that it can be socially effective? Are
sufficient controls placed on the problem producing conditions such
that the desired outcome can not be obtained? Does the achievement of
the desired outcome also result in producing effects that are worse
than the original problem conditions? What can be done about this?

4.

Is the policy efficiently organized, administered and financed?

The United States as a Welfare State
It is instructive to identify a few of the areas in which the United States
has developed ameliorative social programs during the recent years, but, as
yet, has failed to construct comprehensive social policies to guide their
activity.
Some typical welfare state goals are to provide "full employment" without
discrimination for all members of the society who are willing and able to
work, and to regulate the economic system in ways that will assure a
"decent" standard of living with social security "from the cradle to the
grave." To what extent has the United States--the most affluent "welfare
state"--assessed the need for, and formulated comprehensive social policies
to achieve these goals? The following assessments are drawn in large part
from official government documents and the analysis of "experts" published
in the Encyclopedia of Social Work (1977), the authoritative sourcebook of
the National Association of Social Workers in the U. S.
Child Welfare Policy. There is no comprehensive national policy concerning
child welfare (Kahn, 1977, pp. 104-105).
No comprehensive survey of the status of American children exists.
. . . There are no reliable data about child abuse and neglect, despite
widespread publication of alleged rates by advocates of expanded
programs to correct abuse.
U. S. social policy, based on free-market and minimalist intervention
ethic, lacks general family allowances, which are common in most
industrialized countries. . . . In the U. S., some working women may
have modest paid maternity leaves and others have none. In Western and
Eastern European countries, generous paid maternity leaves are common.
. . . This country lacks the universal public health monitoring and
medical care coverage for children that most other industrialized
countries have. . . . Public housing proqrams are fewer than in most

other industrialized countries. One
adequate services in this country is
of personal disposable income, which
income (underline added) to purchase

compensating factor for the less
that Americans have a higher level
allows those with an adequate
the goods and services they need.

Family Policy. There is no comprehensive national policy concerning
families. "In spite of the lip service given to the sanctity of the family
as the basic and most important social unit, there is no national policy or
commitment to substantiate that value" (Giavannoni and Billlingsley, 1977,
p. 407).
"The United States has the reputation of having the highest divorce rate in
the civilized world, and, with a few partial exceptions this appears to be
true" (Leslie, 1977, p. 378). One out of six children under age 18 lived in
one-parent families in 1974, and Paul Glick (1978, p. 53), Senior Demographer
of the U. S. Bureau of Census, estimates that, given the current trends in
divorce and separation, "45 percent of all children born in 1977 will spend
a significant length of time as members of a one-parent family before they
reach the age of 18."
More mothers in one-parent families worked in March 1978 than in two-parent
families, 58.6 percent as compared with 47.8 percent (Bureau of Labor
Statistics Report 531). Furthermore, a Special Labor Force Report (Hayghe,
1976, pp. 13, 18) demonstrated that women had to work in order to survive,
and to help their family "ameliorate the impact of the combination of
inflation and recession on family income. . . . Wives contributed an average
of 26 percent of their families' wage and salary income . . . in March
1975."
Welfare of the Aging. "While scientific advances in the twentieth century
have enabled more human beings to reach old age, there has been a severe lag
in meeting their social, health and economic needs. In effect, longer
physical life too often (in the U. S.) is accompanied by loss of dignity and
social death" (Brody, 1977, p. 74).
Life expectancy at birth increased from about 47 years in 1900 to 71.9 years
in 1974. At the turn of the century the over-65's represented about
4 percent of the total U.S. population; today they comprise about 10 percent.
By the year 2000 it is estimated that there will be about 30.6 million
people over 65 in the U.S. This is a phenomenal growth in the aging
population.
However,
. . . In
costs of
of Labor
1977, p.

"older persons have half the income of their younger counterparts.
1974 about 43 percent of the aged couples could not afford the
the theoretical budget for retired couples prepared by the Bureau
Standards for a modest but intermediate standard of living" (Brody,
57).

"American values such as achievement and success, activity and work,
efficiency, practicality and progress are antithetical to old age in that
the social roles assigned to the elderly do not mesh. . . . Existing social
service systems are mostly inadequate and inappropriate to the needs of the
elderly. . . . Advances have been made in . . . (the) coordination of
practice, research, education, policy and planning, but there is still a lag

in accumulation of knowledge about aging, in its communication to
practitioners, and in its translation into policy and planning" (Brody,
1977, p. 58, 76-77).
Health Policy. "The hazard of income loss because of sickness or injury,
the problems of families with overwhelming medical debts, and the tragedy of
medical care postponed or neglected because of ignorance or because of
prohibitive costs in money or time lost from work have long been a central
concern of social welfare policy" (Piore, 1977, p. 526).
"By 1976, expenditures for medical care . . . amounted to more than
$118.5 billion. . . . Between 1959 and 1974 personal health care
expenditures rose from $10.1 billion to $90.3 billion. About 46 percent of
the total rise is attributed to price increases" (Piore, 1977, p. 529, 530).
From 1977 to 1978, in one year, the costs rose by about 15 percent. Although
"two-thirds of these costs are met by third parties--government, private
health insurance and philanthropy," it is estimated that "40 million Americans
remain outside both the public and voluntary health benefit coverage programs"
(Ibid., p. 539).
There is growing consensus on the need for a national health insurance
system, but neither Congress nor the medical profession have taken the
necessary steps in that direction. "Currently the U.S. ranks 14th among the
nations of the world in infant mortality, which is widely considered a proxy
measure of the health status of a nation" (Ibid., p. 535). "Despite the
common view of the U.S. as progressive, countries such as France, England
and Wales and Sweden have longer life expectancy at birth for both sexes"
(Brody, 1977, p. 56). And there are clear health differences by race in the
U. S. In 1973, for example, the average life expectancy of non-whites was
65.8 years as contrasted with 72.2 years for the white population in the
country as a whole (Piore, 1977, p, 535).
Income Maintenance and Redistribution. The evidence of persistent, enduring
poverty in the United States is indisputable. According to the U. S. Bureau
of the Census (1977, pp. 1-2):
There were 25.9 million persons below the poverty level in 1975,
comprising 12 percent of all persons. Between 1974 and 1975 the number
of persons below the low-income level increased by 2.5 million or
10.7 percent, reflecting the continued inflation and sluggishness in
the economy. For example, during this period the poverty thresholds
increased 9.1 percent reflecting the changes in consumer prices,
whereas personal income per capita increased only 7.5 percent. In
addition, the average annual unemployment rate rose from 5.6 percent to
8.5 percent and the number of persons who exhausted their unemployment
benefits increased from 2.0 million in 1974 to 4.3 million in 1975.
The increase of 2.5 million low-income persons during the 1974-1975
period was the largest single year increase observed since 1959, the
first year for which poverty data were available. . ..
Between 1974 and 1975, the increase in the number of persons below the
poverty level was quite pervasive, occurring for both Black and White
persons, for persons of Spanish origin, and for the young as well as
the elderly. Particularly large percentage increases were observed for
Whites, persons under 65 years, and husband-wife families.

While changes have been effected in "absolute poverty" as measured by the
poverty threshold, very little has been accomplished by further income
equality in the nation. Using the simplest measure of income distribution-the share of the annual income received by portions of the population ranked
by income--the lowest 20 percent of the population has never varied from a
3-4 percent share, while the highest 20 percent has always received about
44 percent (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1977). The economic conditions
which produced this situation shortly after World War II have persisted up
until the present time. Despite the War on Poverty and other governmental
efforts of the past decades, there has been no general reduction in income
equality from 1947 to 1975. Apparently, there will be no economic "welfare
reform," promised by Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, without a
substantial restructuring of the American economy (Northwood, 1978).
A similar assessment could readily be constructed in the social policy areas
pertaining to housing, education, nutrition, community services,
transportation, environmental protection, legal services, the criminal
justice system, and in almost every facet of the life of the society.
The formulation of social policy and the choosing of goals involves making
priority choices. It is myopic not to consider military expenditures as a
social policy choice. As history has proved, the selection of military
policies has many damaging effects for social development, not the least of
which is the reduction of resources available to fund social programs and
implement social policies (Northwood, 1977). Such a political perspective
leads to a key question about the policy process. One may ask: "Who is
winning and who is losing, and what goods (money, status, power) are they
winning or losing by this or that policy decision?" (Tropman et al., 1976,
p. 10). This political question is central and should be used to analyze
any policy proposal (Boulding, 1967; Hillsman, 1976).
In 1976, U.S. Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman commented that military
spending in the proposed budget for 1977 "accounted for one-quarter of all
spending, almost 50 percent of all Federal revenues not earmarked for trust
funds, and 70 percent of all 'controllable outlays'" (Holtzman, 1977). She
proposed that military spending be reduced by $10 billion and the funds be
diverted to a variety of social programs to relieve the effects of inflation
and unemployment, and to provide support for health, education and welfare;
services to the youth and the aging; mass transit construction; and crime
prevention. Her proposal failed to receive enough votes for passage.
Similar attempts were rejected by Congress in 1977 and 1978. However, the
campaign to shift national priorities continues to receive popular and
legislative support. At the same time military budgets grow steadily. And
as the U. S. continues to arm itself, it has also become the leading arms
exporter in the world. According to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the United States delivered a total of $31.6 billion worth of arms
to foreign countries between 1965 and 1974, or just under 50 percent of all
arms traded on the international market (U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1976, p. 73).
In 1954 the New York Times called the United States a "reluctant welfare
state." Twenty-five years later a more appropriate designation would be the
"Warfare-Welfare State."

Toward the Democratization of the Social Policy Process
There are many legal and quasi-legal means of affecting how the government
is run in a democracy. Among the quasi-legal means frequently employed by
most people at some times in their lives are tax evasion and bending or
breaking the law. But most people engage in government legally by observing
the spirit of the law, exercising the vote, or serving in office. In
addition, they may protest what they consider to be an injustice, petition
their elected representatives or other governmental functionaries, or
otherwise enter the social policy process either directly through some form
of government sponsored citizen participation, or indirectly through their
activity with political parties, civic organizations, and social movements.
All of these latter, legally sanctioned activities, make up the social
policy process.
In this paper we have emphasized the thesis that the public social policy
process, in essence, is a vehicle through which government can, and should
be, democratized if it is conducted appropriately and toward that end. The
social policy process has the potential for focusing attention on the major
social problems and the serious shortcomings of the society. Through it,
ameliorative programs can be proposed in the context of alternatives which
can be assessed in terms of the available resources and the desired outcomes.
It has the capacity of generating information about the success of failure
of a particular program, why this is so, and how it can be altered to be
more effective. Thus, the policy process provides one basis for evaluating
the general effectiveness of government. This is much different than
choosing among candidates or officeholders merely on the basis of their
promises, the usual practice in a representative democracy.
Properly organized, the social policy process can facilitate democratic
government. The electoral process, on the one hand, allows the citizenry at
fixed periods of time--the time of elections--to select the men and women
who occupy the formal positions in elective bodies, and who enjoy the rights
and responsibilities for guiding the policy process. In contrast, social
policy process is continuous and ongoing. It provides a channel of
immediate access of the citizenry to the machinery of government. It
involves the direct participation of the citizen, not his representative.
Furthermore, it allows the specialized expertise of the participant to be
brought to bear on the policy. The specialized expertise may derive from
participating in the program, such as a welfare recipient or a service
professional.
As pointed out in the paper, the social policy process is not conducted in
this democratic way in today's modern "warfare-welfare state," the United
States. The purpose of this section of the paper is to identify some of the
barriers to the democratization of the social policy process. Three
barriers are identified. They pertain to (1) the openness of the social
policy process; (2) the relative uninvolvement of the citizenry in the
process, especially of the primary users and social professionals; and
(3) the absence of near-absence of systematic, comprehensive evaluation of
social policies.

The Openness of the Social Policy Process
As the third section of the paper demonstrated, there are few, if any,
comprehensive guiding social policies of relevance to the type of issues
with which the "welfare state" is supposed to be concerned: employment,
inflation, health, education, welfare, housing, the social security of
children, families, and the aging.
In the absence of such policy and for other reasons, the government engages
in endless committee activity devoted to fact-finding about social problem
conditions. Thus, it is safe to say that no nation is as well equipped as
the United States with information about the prevailing problems of the
society. However, this information is not brought to bear in effective
programs to remove or prevent the society from suffering the consequences of
the problems. Occasionally, a committee report may lead to the establishment and/or funding of an ameliorative social program. However, the history
of such efforts demonstrate conclusively that such programs have attained a
modicum of effectiveness only when they have been accompanied by the insistence of mass movements. These movements largely have exerted their
influence through mass protest and through the ballot box rather than
through the internal workings of the social policy process.
The most successful social policies in terms of their effectiveness have
been concerned with military and economic development. The federal government has consistently and regularly allocated some $1.5 trillion to military
expenditures during the past three decades (Sivard, 1977). With the allocation it has achieved, not without tremendous waste of funds and resources,
the greatest military power that the world has ever known. Whether this
great military power provides adequately for the nation's security is a
debatable point.
The economic development has been furthered and fostered through the
military and other programs, particularly through fiscal policy which
provides subsidies to business and industry, and which exempts them from the
payment of tens of billions of dollars in taxes each year. For example,
corporate income taxes in 1944 provided 33.6 percent of the total federal
income in tax revenues, whereas, by 1974, it was only 14.6 percent (Brandon,
Rowe and Stanton, 1976, p. 22). Economists Joseph Pechman and Benjamin
Okner (1974) calculate that if all the special tax breaks were eliminated,
we could cut the income tax rates by an average of 43 percent. Wealthy
individuals who now effectively reduce their tax bills by more than
43 percent would then actually pay more, while the majority would pay less.
Moreover, net interest payments on the national debt of $650 billion
accounted for 14 percent of the domestic baseline expenditures in the U.S.
in 1977 (Schultze, 1976, p. 345). This may be considered as a direct
subsidy to individuals and corporations who own most of the government
bonds.
In making its budget decisions and in the review of its operating
procedures, the federal government has understandably been reluctant to
expose its policy making machinery to the public view, or even to the
scrutiny of Congress in general. Much of the information which guides
social policy is secret or accessible to only a few highly placed
individuals. For Years the military budqets were simply rubber stamped by

an acquiescent Congress while almost every social program, which issued out
of committee after prolonged debate, was subjected to further detailed
examination and criticism. For example, during the Nixon "imperial
presidency" dozens of social programs were vetoed, and when they were
repassed by Congress over the presidential veto, the enabling funds were
diverted or impounded. This situation came to a head in the Watergate Era
when Congress passed legislation to enable its review of budgetary matters
and to restrict the scope of the presidential veto (Gartner, Greer, and
Riessman, 1973; Northwood, 1977, unpublished). Subsequently, President
Carter has challenged some of these Congressional restrictions as excessive
and unconstitutional. Meanwhile, Congress attempts through the courts to
secure access to information about the covert activities of the CIA and the
FBI in order that they can perform adequate budgetary review as to the
nature and effectiveness of these activities.
But much of the policy activity of Congress is not of such a sensitive
nature that it must be protected from the public. However, the ordinary
procedures of Congress preclude widespread public participation. On many
issues, the body simply goes into "executive session" which forbids participation by outsiders. Moreover, hearings on proposed policy changes are
held at the whim of the committee chairman to which proposals are submitted.
The committee hearings often occur in Washington, and at times that are
convenient to its members, not the public. Furthermore, the legislative
processes by which a bill is enacted are complicated, and not understood by
many of those who wish -to be heard. There is not time enough for everybody
to participate who wants to.
The volume of legislation is massive, too much for any congressman to absorb
by himself. Furthermore, Congress has "disabled itself" by the way control
is exercised over expenditures: revolving funds are established; government
corporations are created; the refusal to prohibit transfers between
appropriations; the authorization of the use of departmental receipts
without the limitation of amount; the voting of lump sum appropriations
(O'Connor, 1974, p. 114).
As a result of these and other complicating procedures, the process of
governing becomes more and more indirect. Congressmen become more dependent
on the polling process as a source of information. They hold informal
meetings with organized constituencies which are far removed from the
decision making process. They come to rely on the people who are close to
them for advice. Among these are the paid legislative representatives of
special interest groups, who can afford to maintain offices near the action,
who are more-or-less skilled in legislative and political persuasion, and
who have the resources to perform personal favors or offer other incentives
in return for the legislator's vote. There are probably hundreds of effective
lobbyists representing business, military and economic interests for every
advocate of consumers-and health, education and welfare agencies. Even the
latter are often more sensitive to the issues and concerns of the
professionals than they are to the needs of the poor and the disadvantaged.
In the discussion so far, the reference has been to the social policy
process at the national governmental level. A similar account could be
constructed of the state and local levels--with a similar result. To be
sure, there are ways in which the policy process differs at these levels.
In 9anaral, legislators are more accessible, more informed about local

problem conditions, and more responsive to mass persuasion which can be
organized more easily in the local area. Furthermore, most officeholders
depend upon a home area for their election, and they tend to listen to home
town voters more than others. However, local and state governments do not
have at their disposal massive national resources often required for the
solution of serious social problems. Consequently, there has grown up a
traditional division of labor among governmental units in which issues of
the social welfare are usually considered to rest in the domain of national
government. Thus, they may be ignored by local governmental units.
The Discouragement of Citizen Participation
One of the unfortunate consequences of this relatively closed system of
policy making has been the discouragement of citizen participation both in
the electoral and social policy processes. For example, Walter Dean Burnham
(1970) conducted a survey of the voting turnout in 20 leading "western"
nations between the years of 1945-1969. He found that an average of less
than 60 percent of the eligible voters participated in elections in the
United States as compared with an average of 83.3 percent in the balance of
the nations. While it is said that a large proportion of Americans belong
to at least one voluntary association, perhaps half the adult population of
the United States, very few are "active" in organizations that involve
themselves in "politics," perhaps one in seven persons (Smith and Freedman,
1972, Chapter 4).
Labor unions are frequently considered as effective
channels for influencing social policy. However, in the United States
during the period 1950-1970, the labor force increased by 20 million
persons, but unions enrolled barely one-quarter of that number, a very low
proportion in comparison with trade union membership in the industrialized
nations of the world (Anderson, 1974, p. 164).
Thus, the great majority of the people are not affiliated with voluntary
associations with a particular interest in the policy process. At the same
time, in every city, town and hamlet of the nation a small proportion of the
population is actively engaged in such efforts, and in many organizational
forms. Perhaps the most influential are the political parties and
associations, the organized trade unions, business, commercial and
professional associations, the churches, the single and multiple issue
movements that emerge around particular sectors of the population (women,
minorities, the aging); particular issues (taxation, peace, protection of
the consumer or the ecology), or particular activities (sports, religious
culture, hobbies). All of these are more or less active when the social
policy affects their area of interest. In other words, with a few notable
exceptions, they do not have a sustained and scheduled relationship with
respect to the public policy process.
In fact, the political participation by voluntary associations and their
members is actively discouraged by the government in several effective ways.
First, there are restrictions on the political activities in which
government workers may engage imposed by many governmental units. In
addition, associations which are politically active may have their tax
exempt status cancelled; and they are required to pay higher postal rates.
Furthermore, political surveillance and other forms of harrassment have
been used by the government during recent years

activities that run counter to the prevailing administration. The ambiguous
definition and uneven enforcement of such provisions does not mitigate their
chilling effect.
The voluntary associations which are involved in public policy making and
administration have a particular relationship to the government agencies
with which they are associated. Some are given access to the means of
policy making and administration, and some are not. Warner (1973,
pp. 253-254), who has reviewed the empirical literature on the subject,
comments: "Both policy and administration are essentially political
processes, and therefore mediation by voluntary associations requires
competition in political struggle."
Some voluntary associations are
"captured" or "coopted" by the administrative agency; in some instances, the
reverse occurs. In any case, the special working relationships "differ
markedly from the general image of voluntary associations as 'free standing'
units of society that appeal to public agencies for consideration of
particular points of view, as well as to mobilize public opinion and
'educate the public'." Where voluntary associations take on a public or
quasi-public character, few of them have adequate machinery for public
accountability when they take on public functions. For example, business
and professional associations may be accorded the right to accredit or
police the activities in their area of expertise, yet turn out to be more
responsive to their colleagues than to the society.
Although federal regulations are more cognizant of, more numerous, more
developed, and more consequential toward citizen participation than they
were a decade ago, "a single, explicated uniform and consistent federal
policy concerning citizen participation has neither been established legislatively or administratively." That is the conclusion of Hans Spiegel, who
reviewed the subject in 1971. Furthermore, he points out that:
The federal administration at its highest levels favors citizen participation that is congruent with and not disruptive of municipal and
federal program management, (and it) opposes citizen participation that
results in citizen control over, as contrasted with citizen involvement
in, any key aspects of programs. (Spiegel, 1971, p. 14)
The federal record of support for citizen participation is in accord with
this conclusion. As a case in point, Pivin and Cloward have been leading
advocates of "disruptive strategies" to force bureaucratic agencies to meet
the needs of the poor and the disadvantaged. An agency following this
strategy instituted "massive rent strikes" and "mass claims for welfare
benefits" (Pivin and Cloward, 1971). For a time, the agency was supported
by federal grants and a large national foundation. These funds gradually
disappeared. This example is not atypical; it is a general rule. Therefore
we conclude that it is unlikely that the federal government will finance any
significant reform unless the class composition of the governing bodies
change.
Pivin writes (Pivin and Cloward, 1974, p. 340): "As localities lose their
political autonomy, the forces that remain viable will be those capable of
exerting national influence." And that influence will be exerted through
organizing citizen participation around progressive social policies with or
without government support and funding.

Failure to Evaluate Policy Outcome
The effectiveness of social policy can only be measured with certainty if
there is a systematic evaluation of the outcome of the process. Without
this evidence one cannot be sure of what effects and consequences were
actually produced by the policy, and whether these were the desired ones.
Even where the outcome is thoroughly and systematically assessed, there is
room for doubt and uncertainty, given the level of development of the
research technology in social evaluation. But without the application of
the science that exists, speculation remains rampant, and the hope of the
society to be guided by social policies that are benevolent, sound and
reasonable is a pipedream and a narcotic.
What the measurement of the outcome can produce is reasonable information
whether the policy actually affected the lives of the designed beneficiaries
and whether the designated problem conditions were somewhat ameliorated.
Outcome measurement can tell us whether the policy had little or no desired
effects, or, instead, contributed to worsening conditions. Finally, it can
provide useful evidence to indicate a different line of social intervention.
It should be remembered that the evaluation of outcome differs from the
evaluation of performance, which is concerned with efficiency in the organization and administration of policy. Thus, it is entirely possible to be
very efficient in performing activities that may satisfy the consumer and
the producer, but be worthless in producing the desired effects.
There are very serious questions about whether any social program, let alone
a social policy, has ever been evaluated systematically in terms of its
efficiency and effectiveness in the United States. The reasons for this are
many.
In the first place, social programs are primarily considered by congressmen
as a vehicle for distributing money or services to designated persons or
districts rather than a way of testing the soundness of a social policy
(D. Cohen, 1972). While lip service is given to the policy, and it may
provide a persuasive rationale for the passage of legislation, many
congressmen are more concerned with getting something done immediately for
the electorate than with the evaluation of long term effectiveness. Thus,
where evaluation is required by the enabling legislation, usually this
pertains to the efficiency in costs and administration, which can be
measured immediately.
Second, social programs are frequently drafted in terms that stress legal,
administrative and fiscal restrictions while the plan of organization and
intervention is expressed more generally in order to allow for innovation.
Moreover, since programs may be instituted simultaneously in many areas and
under widely differing auspices, it is difficult to manage their evaluation,
even where responsibility for this is kept in federal hands. Although the
research evaluation may be centrally administered, the data are collected
locally where the action takes place. There are dozens of sources of
variation and error that exist where there is no standardized design and
methodology, and the data are collected and analyzed by persons with
insufficient knowledge, skill and motivation. All of these variations and
errors will occur in the implementation of broadscale social programs.

The complex problems of evaluation have been discussed by Alice Rivlin
(1971) and others (Haveman, 1977; Rossi and Williams, 1972; Caro, 1977;
Weiss, 1972). Her conclusion is that:
Neither social service systems nor government programs are organized to
generate information about their effectiveness. Furthermore, new
techniques or combinations of resources are not tried out systematically so that their effectiveness can be evaluated. Until programs are
organized so that analysts can learn from them and systematic
experimentation is undertaken on a significant scale, prospects seem
dim for learning how to produce better social services.
Furthermore, she doubts that systematic experimentation can be devised,
organized and funded by the federal government for reasons such as the
following: First of all is the large dollar cost of experimentation.
Besides costliness, there are many ethical questions such as: Does society
have the right to take risks with the lives and well-being of individuals in
the name of experimentation? Can services be provided to some people and
not to others in the name of experimentation? If legal and moral questions
can be answered satisfactorily, there are many technical research problems
to be solved, such as appropriate sampling, replication and the control of
extraneous variables. A major barrier is the long time it takes from the
initiation of the study to the production of usable results in policyrelevant forms. Rivlin notes that "experiments may become substitutes for
action or excuses for inaction" (p. 118).
Despite these disadvantages, Rivlin believes that , "the federal government
should follow a systematic experimentation strategy in seeking to improve
the effectiveness of social action programs." Her approach is to decentralize the authority for making evaluations of effectiveness. First of
all, the local community should be held accountable for how federal dollars
are spent with rewards being bestowed on local agencies which produce more
efficiently. To be sure, there are difficulties in this strategy because
local sponsors might be influenced to bias their research methodology and
findings to assure a steady flow of federal investment. However, this might
be partially overcome by the federal government developing and refining
performance measures, defined in terms of the program outcomes, which would
be instituted and monitored at the federal level.
Moreover, Rivlin advocates experimenting with mechanisms prevalent in the
private market economy for certain programs. For example, instead of
federal support to public education in general, vouchers might be provided
to parents who could choose the school in which they would enroll their
children. Such a voucher system would "accentuate existing problems of
income equality" if the parents chose to pay the premium required in
addition to the government voucher to send their children to more expensive
schools, offering richer curricula, smaller classes and more elaborate
facilities. But this outcome might be controlled through providing larger
vouchers to poor children, and in other ways.

Even though economists know that the private market "does not work perfectly
in the private sector," Rivlin (p. 134, 138-139) notes that there are
offsetting hqnefits:
Perhaps major national manufacturers would invest considerable sums in
new educational techniques, hoping that they could be proved more
effective and then sold to schools seeking to enhance their attractiveness to students. These companies, however, would tend to invest in
hardware and materials on which they could retain exclusive rights
through patents and copyrights. There might be serious neglect of
methods and approaches that, while conceivably more effective than
hardware, could be easily copies without compensation to the original
developer.
Rivlin's comments are not atypical. They characterize the orientation of
the government analysts toward social programs and social policies. First,
they recognize the essential need for outcome evaluation if any adequate
measure of effectiveness is to be obtained. Then they raise a host of
technical, moral and political problems that explain why such measures have
not been instituted in the United States, and which render them unlikely in
the future. Third, they tend to shift the responsibility for systematic
evaluation from federal to local authorities. Finally, they reaffirm their
faith, albeit with reservations, in the efficacy and the benevolence of
private market mechanisms as the best way to do the job.
Critics of this line of reasoning are quick to note that the failure to
evaluate the effectiveness of social programs and social policies is closely
related to the reluctance of the government to open up its policy machinery
to critical inspection and with its efforts to discourage citizen participation
in the policy process. The three factors are intertwined and interrelated.
Therefore, any realistic program to democratize the social policy process in
America will have to engage in political reform to be successful. This does
not mean that small measures cannot be taken now to improve every facet of
the process, but that, in so doing, attention must also be directed to
improving the social policies that govern the policy making machinery.

A Modest Agenda for Social Policy Researchers
Researchers and scholars, no matter what their field of inquiry, are
expected to be guided by the standards and ethics which pertain to
scientific inquiry and its conduct. This means, among other things, that
they work to assure the validity and reliability of their research, and that
they share the methodology and findings in ways that promote the growth and
development of science and scientifically guided practice. Furthermore,
when working with human subjects, they are required to employ a variety of
safeguards which protect people from unfair manipulation, exploitation,
embarrassment, or harm.
In addition to these standards, researchers and scholars have an increased
responsibility when they deal with social policy issues. We have stressed
the functions of social policy for achieving benevolent, sound and reasonable changes in the society through the enhancement of the democratic
problem solving process. It is the responsibility of the social policy

analyst to conduct his work in such a way that these democratic potentials
are maximized.
Donald N. Mitchell (1970, p. 3) has posed this issue nicely in the question:
"Who has the right to do what to whom, on what grounds?" Thus, there must
continue to be an ever-present challenge to sources of legitimacy and
authority in society. Mitchell sees this as one of the important roles of
the voluntary association in society. In this paper we postulate that it is
the responsibility of every worker in social welfare organization to review
his/her activities from time to time in the perspective of the issues raised
by this question, including especially the social policy researcher. To
meet this added responsibility, the following modest program is proposed for
social policy researchers and scholars:
1.

Understand the nature of the public social policy process and its
potential for democratizing government.

2.

Conduct research in ways: that maintain the openness of the public
policy system with respect to quantity, quality, accessibility and
timing of information relevant to policy formulation and decision-making;
that facilitate the organization and scheduling of citizen participation
in all activities of the process; that require the clear specification
and measurement of the desired outcomes for all policies.

3.

Identify the implicit and explicit value assumptions that underlie
social policies, and elaborate both the positive and negative effects
and consequences of a policy and its implementation.

4.

Explore the potentials of working with non-governmental organizations,
voluntary associations, and social movements interested in improving
the distributive justice for the user and the consumer.

This paper has begun the analysis of the nature of the social policy process
and its potential for democratization. But much remains to be done. To
begin with, it is necessary to root out the conservative ideology that
automatically accords benevolence to government social policies and to the
policies of the "welfare state." The works of Galper (1975), Gil (1973,
1976), O'Connor (1973, 1974), Romanyshin (1971, 1974), Bailey and Brake
(1975), Roby (1974) Cloward and Pivin (1971, 1974), Mandell (1975), Castells
(1977) and Titmuss (1962, 1969, 1974) are helpful in this respect, among
others. However, there are many themes in this body of writing which
belittle the importance of social planning and the social policy process as
necessary vehicles for democratization, with which the author does not
agree. Time does not allow a detailed analysis of this important subject.
Furthermore, there are many small reforms that can be made in the practice
of policy and the policy making machinery which can facilitate major reform
if this is not lost sight of in the tinkering process. Policy researchers
can enter the struggle right now by improving their current research and
organizational techniques.
For example, where data are collected firsthand as in social surveys and
systematic observation, the process can be scheduled in ways that information is given to the respondent as well as information obtained from the

respondent, if not prior to data collection then immediately following. It
is possible to use citizen review panels before, during and after the data
collection. These have relevance both to improving the research and
informing the public. Where data are gathered strictly from secondary
sources, the same potential exists for citizen review and interpretation.
Furthermore, the information process should be organized and scheduled so as
to promote conjoint planning and decision making.
Policy related research typically has been associated with the management
echelon of organization. However, there is no inevitable reason why this
needs to be so. Of course, management frequently is the sponsor or funder
of such research and often controls access to the data. Therefore, it may
be difficult, or seemingly difficult, for the researcher to institute an
open policy stance. Thus, it would seem that the researcher is faced with a
moral problem when he opposes management policy. There are many alternatives available to the researcher in such cases. What the author is arguing
for is that the researcher take the moral stance that public policy is an
open process and that he guide his behavior accordingly. The resourceful
researcher can usually devise procedures for circumventing onerous
restrictions. The motivated researcher can usually manage, over time, to
organize his research activities in ways and in settings which are conducive
to his interests and amenable to the open policy (Kim and Wellons, 1976).
It should be recognized, however, that with growing specialization and
bureaucratization of research and the settings in which it is done, the work
is so fragmented that many of the personnel are not even aware of the policy
implications and the policy uses to which data are amenable. Furthermore,
the difficulties of organizing and scheduling citizen participation in the
research process may seem like an obstacle or barrier to productivity,
unnecessary work for meager results, or a task beyond the scope of the
researcher or for which he is ill-prepared to manage effectively. In
addition, he may never have questioned the utility or benevolence of his
work--that is what he is paid to do. These many reasons underscore the
necessity for raising the consciousness of those engaged in social welfare
work, and especially the researchers engaged in evaluation of social
programs or social policy.
One way of doing this is to clearly spell out the desired outcomes and
beneficiaries of the research. Another, more preferable way is for the
researcher and the scholar to put their skills and talents to use with
organizations which are clearly directed toward achieving distributive
justice for the consumers and the users of social policy. By association
with the disadvantaged sectors of society, the researcher and the scholar
can acquire a better understanding of the problem conditions and a realistic
knowledge of what is required for their amelioration. Too many professionals
forget whatever experiences they may have had in the past that impelled them
to seek ameliorative change, and they begin to shape their work according to
the status quo expectations of their sponsors.
But it need not be this way
Of course, it will require a political
struggle to realize the democratic potentials of the social policy process,
just as it requires a political struggle to elect good men and women to
office and to keep them oriented toward distributive justice. The current
high cost of running for public office effectively places this option beyond
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the means of most people. This makes it imperative that the
social policy
process be kept open and democratic in its means and ends. In
this, social
policy analysts, at least, can play their part in helping bring
about a
better tomorrow.
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